FIRST ONE @ ONE FIRST

Post-Comstocking

Posted in Case Reports by Mike Sacks on January 12, 2010

Conservative principles of law-and-order and limited government clashed this morning in United States v. Comstock.  At issue was the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 4248, which provides for the federal government’s civil commitment of sex offenders after they have served out their full sentences in federal prisons.

On the one hand, section 4248 keeps off the streets convicted sex offenders deemed by federal authorities to be a continuing threat when they otherwise would be released back into the state where they committed their offense.  This much seems wise: if a state is unwilling to exercise its police and public welfare powers by rehabilitating its violent sexual offenders upon their release from federal prisons, the federal government surely shouldn’t just let those deemed a continuing danger to society roam free among, well, society.  This is the United States’ position in Comstock.

On the other hand, section 4248 relies on provisions of the constitution that may not authorize such federal action, however wise or well-intentioned.  Specifically, Comstock argues that the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, both relied upon by Congress in creating section 4248, do not cover civil commitment of criminals when the federal government’s power, through the prison sentence has been exhausted.

Solicitor General Elena Kagan rested her argument for the United States largely on the Necessary and Proper Clause, with barely a nod to the Commerce Clause.  That much in itself was a victory for the late Chief Justice Rehnquist’s “federalism revolution,” which, to varying degrees of success, sought to limit the expansive reach of the Commerce Clause to issues more closely connected to interstate commerce than the permissive post-1937 Courts often allowed.

But only Justice Scalia truly seemed to believe that 4248 also strained the bounds of the Necessary and Proper Clause to maintain law and order.  Justice Scalia looked to the text of the Necessary and Proper Clause, finding nowhere that it authorizes the federal government to act according to what is “necessary and proper for the good of society.”  Rather, he maintained that the clause enabled the federal government’s actions that were necessary and proper to execute another power given to the federal government by the constitution itself.  As such, he agreed with what would be the defendant’s argument that the states and states alone are responsible federal prisoners whose sentences have run.

Kagan countered that indefinite civil commitment of sexual offenders under 4248 was necessary and proper to the “responsible exercise of operating the criminal justice system.”  On this point–that the federal government needed its own civil commitment regime as a “backstop” for when the state governments refused responsibility for released federal prisoners–Justices Alito and Breyer seemed sympathetic.  They peppered G. Alan DuBois, a veteran federal public defender and counsel for Comstock, with hypotheticals about the constitutionality of the federal government’s ability to deal with prisoners who grows more violent while in prison or, in the opposite instance, is injured in jail in an attack by another prisoner as his sentence ends.  Per these and several other hypotheticals, Alito and Breyer both seemed to believe that the federal government does have the power to retain custody over prisoners that it deems dangerous to public health and safety, or to themselves, upon their scheduled release from federal custody.

As Justice Breyer persisted in exploring the federal government’s power to set up, for example, national mental hospitals, Justice Scalia clutched his head in frustration: “No, No, No!  The Issue is not setting up hospitals, it’s detaining and committing people!”  Scalia simply could not believe that any governor or state attorney general, upon receiving a note or a call from the federal government, would deny his or her obligation to civilly commit a sexual offender and rather face the electoral consequences of letting such a criminal roam the state without rehabilitation. Justice Stevens then took the opportunity to look at the statute from the opposite end of Scalia’s looking glass, suggesting that the Court look to the wisdom of the statute and “assume there are cases out there that there is no solution” like Scalia’s belief that all states would naturally accept responsibility for rehabilitating federal prisoners released within their borders.

But DuBois stood firm against Stevens’, as well as Justice Ginsburg’s, apparent approval of the federal “backstop” when states refuse to cooperate.  Chief Justice Roberts tested DuBois’s position, asking that “if a state says no” to receiving a released, but still dangerous, federal prisoner, “then the federal government says, ‘you have to’?”  DuBois dug in: “Yes, the Constitution requires it.”

Scalia remained astonished that the other justices even entertained the federal government’s claims of responsibility.  Noting that states have involuntary commitment procedures, he wondered why the federal government could not simply fund an office that brings state proceedings for involuntary commitment.  “They should do that!” Dubois actually shouted in reply.  When Stevens tried to get the Court back to assessing whether 4248 itself was constitutional, Scalia shot back that the statute “isn’t even necessary!”

Towards the end of the argument, Justice Sotomayor interjected with a compromise, asking DuBois if it would be constitutional for a judge to mandate civil commitment for a sexual offender during his trial’s sentencing phase.  If such a mandate contained protections to avoid turning indefinite commitment into interminable detention, then it would be constitutional, replied DuBois.

Sotomayor’s trial-judge pragmatism may persuade all but Scalia (and possibly the ever-silent Justice Thomas) to side with public safety over rock-ribbed federalism and uphold 4248 as constitutional.  If this happens, then Scalia, confronted with Sotomayor’s aggressive questioning this term and her possible coup over his Melendez-Diaz decision in yesterday’s Briscoe v. Virginia, may finally be meeting his match.

UPDATE: Read the official transcript here and use the comments section to call me out on my own transcription errors.

3 Responses

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  1. Miko said, on January 12, 2010 at 3:26 pm

    If Sotomayor succeeds in fully overturning the silliness that is Melendez-Diaz, she will earn the “Wise Latina” title in my heart forever.

  2. DJ Jaffe said, on January 13, 2010 at 8:26 am

    I have to ask. I am not a lawyer, but helped found a public interest law firm ( treatmentadvocacycenter.org ). We are family members of the mentally ill and work to try to enable some to get care “before” they become danger to self or others. (Existing law largely requires it).We are talking about a small group with a history of violence that is associated with going off medications. I have long believed that the Kendricks decision has application to the work we are doing, even though it was developed for SVPs. I.e, the Supreme Court has defined an easier to meet commitment standard that could have use to with helping the mentally ill get treatment. Am I wrong?

  3. Conspiracy! « FIRST ONE @ ONE FIRST said, on January 18, 2010 at 12:06 pm

    [...] “Mid-Majors”: Get in line by 6am.  Last week’s cases exemplify the “mid-major” cases: issues that attract the public’s attention [...]


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