Tony Mauro of the National Law Journal is reporting on the opening of Potter Stewart’s papers at Yale:
Stewart died in 1985 at age 70, but he stipulated that his papers would not be made public until the retirement of all justices with whom he served. Justice John Paul Stevens was the last justice in that category, so his departure was the trigger for the release of Stewart’s papers, at long last.
[...] From an initial scan of his case and correspondence files, it does not appear, however, that scholars will learn much about how his brethren won over his vote. The case files generally contain just successive drafts of opinions, with little else.
Mauro’s initial impression of a lack of juicy behind-the-scenes details is corroborated by what I learned in a brief exchange with Professor Larry Tribe at the Kagan hearings. Tribe was a Stewart clerk in the 1967-68 term and told me that Stewart burned much of his more sensitive papers. Learning this dampened my enthusiasm to make a trip to New Haven to go digging through Stewart’s records, but perhaps I may still head up there at the end of the summer.
Readers of F1@1F may know that I’m a big fan of Stewart’s “scrupulously non-ideological” jurisprudence, as Mauro describes it. Indeed, if I were ever to write a biography of a Supreme Court justice during his tenure on the bench, I would look to Stewart. He is of a dead breed of judicial conservatism that will be due for a resurrection in the next decade or two.
As the public begins to recognize that originalism is not at all a safeguard against–but rather a thin veil masking–results-oriented, unprincipled judging, we will see a return of confidence in judges who need no theory of everything to be good, careful, honest judges. At least so I hope. Today’s liberal bloc is often derided for being too pragmatic and moderate, that the left needs ideological liberals in the molds of Douglas, Black, Warren, Brennan, and Marshall. But I think the answer is in more Stewarts, Harlans, Whites, and O’Connors on the right. A perfect court, in my mind, would have its Brennan/Marshall’s and Scalia/Thomas’s on the wings, with a broad and heterodox middle taking each case as it came. That would be a diverse bench. The question remains, however, whether in the age of movement conservatism there remain any pragmatic right-leaning judges or lawyers for future Republican presidents to appoint.
Perhaps some of Stewart’s papers that survived the fireplace may hold a blueprint for a resurgent pragmatic conservatism on the Court.
The WSJ Law Blog calls its readers’ attention to a New Yorker feature on Justice Sotomayor:
[W]e were delighted to open our digital copies of the New Yorker this week to find a lengthy and wide-ranging article about Sotomayor. The timing, in our minds, couldn’t have been better.
The article, by reporter Lauren Collins, is worth reading for a host of reasons. But for our money, the piece is a standout largely due to the nuance with which it treats its subject. She’s eminently personable, but has already raised eyebrows with her aggressive questioning from the bench. She’s a stickler for preparation, but isn’t averse to letting down her hair as well. She’s a liberal given to quoting the likes of Carol Gilligan, but still rules for the prosecution the vast majority of the time.
To me, the timing couldn’t be better particularly because of this final point. On Monday–F1@1F’s first, freezing day in line–the Court will hear Briscoe v. Virginia, and Sotomayor could very well be the fifth vote to reverse last year’s 5-4 decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.
Melendez-Diaz held that the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause requires prosecutors to put forensic analysts on the witness stand rather than simply enter their lab reports into evidence. Justice Scalia wrote the for the majority, in which he was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Justice Kennedy dissented for himself, Justices Breyer and Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts. As we all know, Souter has since been replaced by Sotomayor. Importantly, she is a former prosecutor whose Second Circuit record is friendlier to the prosecution than Justice Souter’s criminal law jurisprudence.
Whereas Scalia and Thomas sometimes find that their originalism incidentally leads them to liberal results, such as in Confrontation Clause cases, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg had long established themselves as friendlier to criminal defendants than to their government prosecutors. Meanwhile, in Melendez-Diaz, Roberts, Kennedy, and Alito voted for conservative law-and-order principles, but Justice Breyer’s pragmatism led him to contest that Scalia’s holding would be simply too heavy a burden on the system.
For Scalia, his Constitution wins regardless of the practical effects. But Briscoe addresses the concerns that Scalia ran roughshod over in Melendez-Diaz, suggesting that Scalia’s Confrontation Clause ideals have their limits. By forcing governments to expensively transport their limited numbers of lab technicians all over the place, Melendez-Diaz could consequentially require the technicians not only to spend more time on the stand than in the lab, but also lead to hairy procedural defaults when a single analyst’s work for different cases comes to trial in several courtrooms at once.
As a trial and circuit judge, Sotomayor exhibited the law-and-order streak and experience-based pragmatism that animated the Melendez-Diaz dissenters. Briscoe is Sotomayor’s first test over whether she will bring her Second Circuit preferences to the Supreme Court. If she does, Melendez-Diaz will fall after only one year as precedent, even if her eight senior colleagues don’t budge.